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The debt illusion hypothesis holds that taxpayers may underestimate the present discounted value of 
future tax liabilities under debt finance.  The empirical question arises as to whether debt illusion at the 
local government level can affect housing values.  This proposition is evaluated by investigating whether 
local fiscal variables are fully capitalised into housing values by means of a pooled time-series, cross-
sectional analysis of 27 metropolitan municipalities in Sydney, Australia, for the period 1989 to 1991.  
The results indicate that municipal debt is under-capitalised into housing values, and accordingly suggests 
that local government expenditure may be systematically biased upwards. 
In its most general form fiscal illusion refers to the systematic misperception of both the benefits 
and costs of government activity by taxpayers, and the effects of this misperception on public 
expenditure in a given fiscal jurisdiction.  Within this broad definition scholars have identified five 
specific types of fiscal illusion.  The revenue-complexity hypothesis holds that taxpayers may 
miscalculate their tax burden due to the fragmentation of the revenue - raising system.  Secondly, 
the degree of income elasticity of the revenue system is thought to influence the volume of public 
spending. A further source of fiscal illusion resides in the "flypaper" effect, where 
intergovernmental grants may increase government expenditure by more than an equivalent increase 
in income from other sources.  A fourth type of fiscal illusion is renter illusion which holds that a 
relationship exists between the proportion of real estate renters in a given jurisdiction and the level 
of public expenditure ceteris paribus . The fifth purported cause of fiscal illusion is debt illusion 
which represents the focus of the present paper. 
In essence, the debt illusion hypothesis postulates that leveraged fiscal systems are more costly to 
evaluate than comparable systems based on current taxation, and therefore engender higher levels of 
government expenditure.  Oates has argued that this occurs because voters "...are more likely to 
perceive the costs of public programs if they pay for them through current taxation than if tax 
liabilities are deferred through public-sector borrowing".1  The theoretical basis for this observation 
rests on the assumption that individual taxpayers possess highly imperfect information on the time 
paths of future benefits and costs of government activity.  Thus "the excess of the present value of 
perceived future net benefits over the present value of actual net future benefits represents an 
illusionary addition to wealth which can affect real consumption and investment decisions".2  
Accordingly, since a price differential can arise between the perceived tax-price of debt-based 
1 
expenditure and tax-based expenditure, reliance on debt financing will induce a larger volume of 
government expenditure ceteris paribus. 
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Given that fiscal illusion emerges when taxpayers underestimate the present discounted value of 
future tax liabilities under debt finance, the question arises as to the implications of this for markets, 
and especially housing markets.  In general, since assets and not individuals are taxed at the local 
level, the empirical issue becomes one of the efficacy of community debt capitalisation into 
individual asset values.3 The notion of debt capitalisation provides the basis for the empirical 
assessment of the potential impact of debt illusion on housing values.  The argument has been put 
forward as follows: 
 Consider two otherwise identical communities that undertake identical capital projects.  
One community, call it A, finance the project out of current revenues, while community 
B chooses to employ bond finance so as to spread out the payments for the project over 
future years.  At the end of the current year, the sole differences between a 'typical 
resident' of A and B will be that the latter will have a future tax liability whose present 
discounted value equals the recent differential tax payment by the resident of A.  In a 
world of mobile consumers, this future tax liability associated with residing in 
community B will become capitalised into lower property values in B...other things 
being equal, we should find, that if there is a debt illusion, that the future tax liabilities 
associated with the debt are not fully capitalised into local property values.4 
The present paper seeks to test this hypothesis by determining whether local fiscal variables are 
capitalised into housing values by means of pooled time-series, cross-sectional analysis of 27 
metropolitan Sydney municipalities for the period 1989 to 1991. 
The paper itself is sub-divided into four main areas.  The first section attempts to provide a brief 
synopsis of the most important previous empirical approaches to the problem.  Attention then falls 
on the models and hypotheses employed in the present study, followed by a detailed discussion of 
the results of the estimation procedures.  The paper ends with some brief concluding remarks. 
REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
For our present purposes two previous empirical studies are especially important, the details of 
which are outlined in Table 1 below: 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Oates tested debt capitalisation in the wider context of an empirical evaluation of Tiebout mobility 
and local government finance.5 Using a sample of municipal data, Oates sought to assess "...the 
effects of property taxes and local expenditure programs on property values".6 After regressing 
housing values against various socio-economic determinants along with municipal tax rates and 
expenditures, Oates found that housing values are negatively related to tax rates and positively 
related to expenditures. He used the results to argue that consumers will select a community (at least 
in terms of housing value) by maximising net benefit, taking into account the positive effect of 
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higher expenditure levels and the detrimental effect of higher tax-prices. Such outcomes have 
persistently been verified in the numerous housing capitalisation studies that followed.7 However, 
these studies do not provide an adequate test, either directly nor indirectly, of the debt illusion 
hypothesis. In general, this is because they are concerned with the capitalisation of expenditure 
financed solely by current taxation, not with the differentials that may exist between identical 
communities that finance expenditure with either debt or current taxation. 
In a study more closely resembling the present paper, Epple and Schipper regressed median home 
values against a standard set of socio-economic variables and a proxy for unfunded pension 
liabilities.8  The hypothesised value for the unfunded service requirement was unitary and negative 
indicating that municipal residents expected pension obligations to be funded from local taxes.  If 
full capitalisation of the liability was found, then the presumption would be that debt illusion did 
not exist and the tax-price of debt funded expenditure was accurately perceived.9 The results did not 
support the hypothesis of no capitalisation. However, Epple and Schipper noted that further work 
was required10, whilst Inman observed that the expected differential between estimated 
(underestimated) and actual unfunded pension liabilities was crucial to any examination.11 
Subsequently, Inman reexamined the issue of pension funding, finding that the continued 
controversy on the correct estimation of capitalisation models, and the lack of consistent and 
independent measures of unfunded liabilities, was a significant reason why only Epple and Schipper 
had addressed this issue.12 The present study attempts to go at least some way towards meeting this 
need.13 
MODELS AND HYPOTHESES 
As we have seen, if housing values do not fully capitalise debt, then the debt illusion hypothesis per 
se  may hold; that is, voters in a municipality may underestimate either the contingencies associated 
with debt as against current taxation, or prefer "control" over the levied asset.14 A regression 
approach can be employed to determine the impact of debt illusion on housing values. 
Table 2 outlines the models and variables utilised in testing the debt capitalisation theory. Real 
urban housing values in twenty-seven city municipalities over a three year period are regressed 
against various socio-economic and fiscal determinants of housing value using a pooled cross-
sectional, time-series analysis. The models and data selected may be justified on three grounds. 
First, given that "..the cross-sectional units are geographical regions with arbitrarily drawn 
boundaries" we would not expect the assumption of cross-sectional independence to hold, and 
accordingly the decision to employ a cross-sectionally correlated model may be decided on a priori  
grounds.15 The error components (or random effects) formulation selected accounts for the relative 
size of cross-sectional observations to time-series measurements, the large number of unobservable 
random effects in the valuation model, and the type of inferences to made from the present study.16 
Use of this formulation gives estimates of the regression coefficients that have the same properties 
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as Aitken's generalised least squares estimator - errors will be uncorrelated and homoskedastic and 
the least squares estimator will be best linear unbiased. Second, the procedure of employing both 
time-series and cross-sectional pooled data is supported on the basis that "...the problem [of 
capitalisation] is that of comparative statics for which cross-sectional estimation is 
appropriate...ultimately, time-series studies of the adjustment process would provide a valuable 
supplement to cross-sectional studies".17  Finally, the use of urban municipal data is likewise 
supported by the necessity of selecting a large urban area, since it is here that the Tiebout hypothesis 
is most likely to hold.  According to this hypothesis "...the consumer shops among different 
communities offering varying packages of local public services...if this is true, its (the 
municipality's) output of public services (as well as taxes) should influence a community's 
attractiveness to potential residents and should therefore affect local property values".18 The ability 
to "shop" for a preferred residential location is therefore most likely to hold in suburban areas, with 
a common central city area (ie. central business district). The model specification is a reduced form 
regression equation as in Epple and Schipper.19 In line with the hypothesis of delayed capitalisation 
an alternative model consisting of lagged variables is also constructed. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The dependent variable selected is the real median value of representative owner-occupied housing 
in each municipality over the three year data sample period (VAL).  The use of value, rather than 
price, negates the requirement for particular individual variables to account for a housing price 
relationship.20 However, independent variables must be included in order to reflect the desirability 
of housing, both in general and municipality specific.  In the former (IND) is a proxy for housing 
activity, intended to measure across the city, the general demand pressure for suburban homes.21 
Since the index is constructed from housing activity, it would tend to show the relative desirability 
of housing as form of expenditure.  Moreover, it would include information on mortgage interest 
rates, general economic conditions, demographic changes and land availability.  A positive 
coefficient could be expected, showing suburban housing values are affected by increases in the 
general desirability of housing. 
To account for specific municipality variances, real median income (INC) and qualitative variables 
for distances to the central business district, (CITY) and (SUB), are also included.  If housing is 
defined as a normal good, then a positive coefficient should hold for the measure of INC when 
regressed against housing value.  The distance dummies proxy the accessibility of the municipalities 
to the central city. Oates has observed that "since the central city is the primary source of 
employment in the area, individuals should, other things being equal, prefer living close to the city 
to minimise the cost in time and money of travelling to their place of employment (and make the 
leisure activities of the city more accessible)".22 Despite also using this measure, Epple and 
Schipper argue that it may be unsatisfactory in a multi-employment centre city since "...property 
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values will be affected by accessibility to these employment centres as well as by accessibility to the 
central business district".23 However, in general, the distance dummies (which cater for the two 
most "inner" locations) should be positive, but it may well be that middle distance suburban 
locations will be preferred to technically closer, but more depressed, inner city areas.   
In terms of the fiscal variables, real per capita local expenditure (EXP) is examined first.  Evidence 
suggests that "...a household considers the effective property tax rate and the level of local public 
services".24 Since inclusion of both variables is likely to involve simultaneity, expenditure is the 
only measure employed.  Expenditure is expected to be an imperfect proxy for the actual output of 
the local public good because "...we do not know of the existence of data other than expenditure 
that might be used to measure government services".25 Despite this, "...we would expect to find 
that, other things being equal...an increased expenditure...should result in higher property values"26 
reflecting improvements in neighbourhood quality.27 The second fiscal variable is per capita debt 
(DEBT).  In general, the deferred tax obligation implied by debt should be negatively capitalised 
into housing values. Moreover, the extent of this capitalisation should not only be negative, but 
approaching unity indicating full capitalisation. 
Finally, in terms of the general model formulation a log-linear form is preferred. Oates has provided 
the underlying argument: 
 
 The tax, expenditure and distance variables are employed in log form, which somewhat 
enhances their explanatory power.  This would appear to make sense.  As suggested by 
the equation...we would not expect property values to vary linearly with the absolute 
level of the tax rate...Similarly, we might expect that additional expenditures...would 
tend to yield successively diminishing increments of benefits.  Finally a log form for the 
distance variable seems reasonable, since being an additional mile from the central city 
would presumably be more important to someone who was quite close to the city than 
to an individual who was already twenty miles away.28 
 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS  
Given the models set out above, imperfect capitalisation of debt liability into housing values would 
occur since debt and current taxation are viewed as imperfect substitutes.29 Moreover, under these 
circumstances debt is preferred to current taxation, and because of a lower perceived tax-price tends 
to bias municipal expenditures upwards. The ex ante expectation is that if the regressed coefficient 
on debt approaches unity then full capitalisation of local liabilities has occurred, and therefore one 
would reject the debt illusion hypothesis.30 If, on the other hand, the coefficient is less than unity, 
we would expect that debt is preferred to current taxation on the basis of imperfect information, and 
that an illusionary process has occurred.  However, by itself imperfect capitalisation does not imply 
per se  that illusion has succeeded in biasing expenditures, only that a propensity exists for such 
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bias.  The results presented below in Table 3 correspond to their respective a priori  forms in Table 
2, or debt capitalisation and lagged debt capitalisation in log-linear form respectively. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Model 1 details the results of pooled time-series, cross-sectional log-linear regression with median 
housing value as the dependent variable.  The coefficients on the socio-economic variables of INC, 
IND, CITY and SUB are all significant and conform to the a priori  expected signs, indicating that 
housing values are positively related to income, general housing conditions and proximity to the 
central business district.  These results conform to the findings of Oates.31 The coefficients for the 
fiscal variables employed, EXP and DEBT both conform to their expected signs, though only 
DEBT is significant.  In terms of EXP it may be that the level of expenditure in a municipality 
serves as a proxy for taxation, thereby supporting the notion that costs of public expenditure are 
much more recognisable than the benefits associated with that expenditure. Oates has noted that 
"...some things, such as lighting and cleaning of streets, are advantages visible to the eye...though 
are apt to be forgotten when the rate-collector calls".32 It is also possible that Oates' suggestion that 
"...increases in property tax rates unaccompanied by an expanded program of public services will 
depress local property values" will hold.33 Thus, unless the benefits of higher levels of expenditures 
are directly associated with "housing value enhancements" (ie. roads, parks, lighting, libraries) they 
may serve only to highlight the extent of the tax obligation. As for DEBT, the magnitude of the 
coefficient is significantly smaller than unity, offering some limited support for the debt illusion 
hypothesis.  This conflicts with the only other similar study of debt illusion, that of Epple and 
Schipper, who found "...the coefficients on the pension variable [unfunded liabilities as a proxy for 
debt]...are still much larger in magnitude than the model predicts".34 They argued that the high level 
of capitalisation "...may result from not including the present value of unfunded liabilities that will 
accrue in the future, if underfunding continues".35 
Model 2 represents an identical set of variables and assumptions to those contained in Model 1, 
except that debt is lagged by one time period. All the variable's coefficients, except EXP and 
DEBT, are significant and correspond to the a priori  expected signs.  In terms of DEBT, the 
coefficient remains significantly lower than unity, indicating that debt is not fully capitalised into 
housing values and providing prima facie support for the illusionary hypothesis.  Econometrically, 
Models 2's use of lagged debt is not preferred to the unlagged variable employed in Model 1. In 
general, the alternative test for debt illusion also provides tentative support for the illusionary 
hypothesis.  In both models it would appear that municipal debt is imperfectly capitalised into 
housing values, indicating that current taxation and future debt are viewed as imperfect substitutes.  
As we argued earlier, this does not imply per se the fiscal illusion has succeeded in biasing 
expenditures, only that such a propensity exists.  Moreover, Epple and Schipper have proposed that 
imperfect capitalisation may not even imply that fiscal illusion exists, since "...municipalities 
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assume that unfunded pension plans [debt] will be ultimately be bailed out by higher levels of 
government".36 The findings therefore to some extent support Oates and Epple and Schipper in the 
use of the relevant variables, but conflict with Epple and Schipper's conclusion that "...our 
preliminary results do not support the hypothesis of no capitalisation".37  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The present pooled time-series cross-sectional analysis of the effects of local government debt 
levels on property values represents an indirect test of the debt illusion hypothesis.  The results 
obtained from this procedure demonstrate that municipal debt is indeed under-capitalised into 
housing values.  Perhaps the most significant implication of this finding is that municipal debt 
under capitalisation provides necessary but not sufficient evidence for the presumption that debt and 
current taxation are not viewed as perfect substitutes, and debt may be preferred. If this is the case, 
then municipalities which rely on debt financing may exhibit higher levels of expenditures than 
similar municipalities which finance governmental activity out of current taxation. Debt illusion 
may thus be instrumental in biasing public expenditure upwards. 
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TABLE 1  
Selected studies of property values and debt illusion 
 
Author(s) 
and Sources 
Data  
 
Estimation 
(a) 
Dependent 
Variable (b) 
Independent Variables (c) Major Findings 
Oates 53 New Jersey 
municipalities 
Cross-sectional 
1961 and 1963. 
OLS (log-
linear) and 
TSLS 
Median  
residential 
home value 
Effective tax-rate (average 
1956-60), distance to urban 
centre (Manhattan), median 
number of rooms, percentage 
of houses built since 1950, 
median family income, 
percentage of families with 
lower level income. 
Higher tax-rates are 
capitalised into 
housing values. 
Evidence also that 
the positive benefits 
of higher local 
expenditure are 
positively capitalised 
into values.  
Epple and 
Schipper 
130 
Pennsylvania 
municipalities 
and 57 
Pittsburgh and 
nearby 
municipalities. 
Cross-sectional 
1976  
OLS (log-
linear) 
Median 
value of 
residential 
property. 
School expenditures per 
capita, effective tax rate, 
unfunded service cost/ 
market value of property, 
median income, travel time 
to CBD, proportion of homes 
lacking some or all plumbing 
facilities. 
Tax rates are 
negative and 
significantly 
capitalised into 
housing values. 
Unfunded service 
costs (proxy for 
debt)  either 
insignificantly 
positive or 
excessively negative 
(greater than 1) 
indicating over 
capitalisation. 
a) OLS/TSLS - Ordinary Least Squares and Two-Stage Least Squares respectively.  
b) More than one dependent variable indicates alternative equations have been evaluated.   
c) Italicised independent variables indicate significant t-values at 90% or more. 
Source: Oates "The Effects of Property Taxes" 957-971. Epple and Schipper, "Municipal Pension Funding" 141-172. 
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TABLE 2  
Models and variables for property values and fiscal illusion 
 
Method 
 
Pooled time-series, cross-sectional analysis of 27 Sydney municipalities 1989-1991. 
 
Models 
 
(1) lnVALjt = β0 + β1nINCjt + β2lnEXPjt + β3lnDEBTjt + β4lnINDjt + β5lnCITYjt + β6lnSUBjt + ujt  
(2) lnVALjt = β0 + β1nINCjt + β2lnEXPjt + β3lnDEBTjt-1 + β4lnINDjt + β5lnCITYjt + β6lnSUBjt + ujt  
 
Variables Details Data Source(s) Expected 
Sign 
VAL Real median value of owner 
occupied housing in the j-th 
municipality in the t-th time 
period ($). 
NSW Valuer Generals Department, 
New South Wales Real Estate Market 
1989-1991  (Sydney, 1991). 
 
INC Real median income of the j-th 
municipality in the t-th period 
($). 
Australian Taxation Office, Taxation 
Statistics 1989-1991  (Canberra: 
AGPS) 
+ 
EXP Real per capita municipal 
expenditure in the j-th 
jurisdiction in the t-th period ($). 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Local 
Government Finance: NSW 1989-1991 
(Canberra: AGPS, Cat. 5502.1).  
NSW Dept of Local Government, 
Comparative Information on NSW 
Local Government Councils 1989-
1991  (Sydney, 1991).  
+ or - 
DEBT Real per capita municipal debt 
in the j-th jurisdiction in the t-th 
period ($).  
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Local 
Government Finance: NSW 1989-1991 
(Canberra: AGPS, Cat. 5502.1).  
NSW Dept of Local Government, 
Comparative Information on NSW 
Local Government Councils 1989-
1991  (Sydney, 1991).  
- 
IND Proxy for index of general 
housing activity 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
Building Activity - Australia 1989-
1991  (Canberra, AGPS, Cat. 8752.1). 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, House 
Price Indexes: Eight Capital Cities 
1989-1991 (Canberra: AGPS, Cat. 
6416.0). 
+ 
CITY Dummy if municipality is within 
6 kilometres of CBD  
NSW Valuer Generals Department, 
New South Wales Real Estate Market 
1989-1991  (Sydney, 1991). 
+ or - 
SUB Dummy if municipality is 
between 6 and 25 kilometres of 
CBD 
NSW Valuer Generals Department, 
New South Wales Real Estate Market 
1989-1991  (Sydney, 1991). 
+ or - 
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TABLE 3 
Results of  regression estimation for property values and fiscal illusion 
 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 
  
CONSTANT 3.348*  
(1.634) 
2.877* 
 (1.640) 
INC 1.408*** 
 (0.159) 
1.442*** 
 (0.160) 
EXP -0.182  
(0.173) 
-0.243 
 (0.173) 
DEBT -0.078*  
(0.046) 
-0.033  
(0.041) 
IND 0.533**  
(0.205) 
0.448**  
(0.202) 
CITY 0.467***  
(0.083) 
0.475***  
(0.084) 
SUB 0.361*** 
 (0.067) 
0.380***  
(0.067) 
 
Notes: Values in parentheses are the corresponding standard 
errors. Asterisk(s) represent the level of significance; * - 90%, 
** - 95% and *** - 99%.  
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